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ABSTRACT
Cultural heritage sites generate multiple streams of value to stakeholder groups whose 
interests and objectives frequently diverge. Contention over the conservation and 
appropriation of the values generated by heritage sites—whether economic returns, 
contributions to social or political cohesion, or sacred or other personal values associated 
with sites—leads to governance failures with adverse consequences both for the sites 
and for the various constituencies involved. This matter is gaining increasing attention 
among heritage scholars and practitioners. The conservation and management of cultural 
heritage sites can be conceived as a collective action problem arising from the strategic 
interaction of multiple actors. In this paper, we propose that the Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) framework, in conjunction with McGinnis’ Network of Adjacent Action 
Situations (NAAS), can be applied to diagnose the drivers of conflict and management 
failures at cultural heritage sites. By illuminating the inter-related governance dilemmas 
arising at two UNESCO cultural World Heritage sites, Machu Picchu in Peru and Angkor in 
Cambodia, our analysis reveals how either contention over governance dilemmas or the 
evolution of site management strategy can be better understood by using the IAD-NAAS 
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INTRODUCTION
From the 18th century until recent decades, decisions 
by governmental or private actors on the conservation 
and management of archaeological or historical parks, 
landscapes, monuments, or similar cultural heritage 
sites were based on sites’ intrinsic historic, aesthetic or 
rarity value. In the latter 20th century, however, the focus 
shifted from this conservation-led approach. As global 
travel and tourism surged after 1950 and as public policy 
focused on resurrecting historic urban cores, the economic 
contribution of heritage resources came to dominate the 
discourse. In recent years, the intangible values of heritage 
resources such as personal and group identity, indigenous 
and human rights, or the contribution of heritage to 
cultural cohesion and social “wellbeing” have emerged as 
additional considerations (Avrami, MacDonald, Mason, & 
Myers, 2019). Economists have long characterized cultural 
heritage sites as a form of “cultural capital,” productive 
resources that in combination with other inputs generate 
a stream of economic and intangible values over many 
years (Throsby, 1999). The changing emphasis in recent 
decades on which of those value streams should be 
given priority has expanded and diversified the range of 
stakeholder groups eligible to claim a voice in the heritage 
management process.
In the face of this growing complexity, existing 
methods for governing cultural heritage sites and 
managing stakeholders’ contention over their values 
have been criticized increasingly as inadequate to the 
task. International agreements and organizations such 
as the World Heritage system of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
have been challenged as weakly empowered and 
politicized (Bertacchini, Liuzza, Meskell, & Saccone, 2016; 
Meskell, Liuzza, Bertacchini, & Saccone, 2015). National 
governments routinely assert monopoly rights over 
cultural resources although their capacity to fund heritage 
conservation and presentation is limited (Gould, 2018b). At 
the local, or operational, level, the distribution of benefits 
from heritage exploitation and the consequences of site 
preservation for adjacent communities are criticized as 
insensitive and inequitable (Aas, Ladkin, & Fletcher, 2005; 
Hampton, 2005; Herrera, 2014; Meskell, 2012; Smith & 
Waterton, 2009). The boundaries of cultural heritage 
site governance incorporate adjacent communities and 
distant governmental, corporate and private actors and 
institutions, each of which has a stake in decisions affecting 
the heritage site itself. Consequently, cultural heritage 
site management, with numerous stakeholders acting at 
different scales within an often inconsistent mesh of legal 
rights and informal interests, is inherently polycentric, and 
unresolved contention among stakeholders can lead to 
governance failures with adverse consequences both for 
the sites and for the associated constituencies (Seyfi, Hall 
& Fagnoni, 2019). Heritage scholars have long recognized 
these problems but have not advanced methods to analyze 
the governance processes at play.
From this perspective, the conservation and 
management of cultural heritage sites can be conceived 
as a form of collective action problem arising from 
the strategic interaction of multiple actors, and site 
governance dilemmas readily map onto the Ostrom 
Workshop’s Institutional Analysis and Development 
(IAD) framework (McGinnis, n.d.; E. Ostrom, 2005, 2010). 
However, traditional implementations of IAD analysis, 
which generally consider a single focal action situation, 
seem inadequate to fully interpret the challenges of 
governing the imbricated mix of stakeholders involved 
with cultural heritage sites. Recent contributions have 
extended the IAD framework to address interdependent 
collective action problems in polycentric governance 
contexts (Dennis & Brondizio, 2020; Gibson, Andersson, 
Ostrom, & Shivakumar, 2005; Lubell, 2013; McGinnis, 
2011). In particular, McGinnis (2011) proposed the 
Network of Adjacent Action Situations (NAAS) concept in 
which actors engaged in governance task-related action 
situations influence the rules and outcomes of separate 
but interrelated action situations.
In line with this literature, this paper addresses whether 
the IAD framework, amplified by the NAAS construct, 
provides a useful approach to identifying contending 
interests at cultural heritage sites and assessing the 
consequences of stakeholder interactions. After explaining 
the nature and types of collective action dilemmas at 
heritage sites, we introduce the IAD-NAAS framework and 
suggest how the overlapping roles of key actors across 
governance tasks can be used to map the polycentric 
complexity of cultural heritage site management. We then 
illustrate the application of the IAD-NAAS through two 
examples of stakeholder strategic interaction in multiple 
interconnected action situations drawn from the public 
record of two UNESCO World Heritage sites, Machu Picchu 
in Peru and Angkor in Cambodia.
The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, we show 
how the IAD framework amplified by the NAAS construct 
constitutes a productive means to analyze both specific 
dilemmas involving the strategic interaction of actors 
at different levels of cultural heritage site management 
and changes over time in management strategies and 
priorities. Second, the paper advances the literature on 
interdependencies among collective action problems 
through a novel application concerning the governance of 
such sites.
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COLLECTIVE ACTION DILEMMAS AT 
HERITAGE SITES
Government monopoly over tangible cultural heritage 
resources is commonplace worldwide. State control and 
funding for the designation, exploration, preservation, 
conservation, and public presentation of cultural heritage 
has been justified by market failures that occur because 
heritage sites exhibit characteristics of public goods, 
generate positive externalities, or are perceived as merit 
goods (Benhamou, 2020; Rizzo & Throsby, 2006). However, 
this “top-down” model for governance of cultural heritage 
has been criticized both for a problematic track record for 
effectiveness (Meskell, 2010, 2018) and for adverse impacts 
on the tangible property and intangible traditional rights of 
local communities (Gould, 2018a; Smith & Waterton, 2009). 
Although cultural heritage sites rarely conform to the typical 
physical characteristics or property rights bundles identified 
with commons by Ostrom (2010), governance dilemmas 
involving access, use and conservation of heritage sites are 
analogous to generic governance tasks at natural resource 
commons such as assignment, appropriation, provision, 
monitoring and sanctioning.
Assignment dilemmas arise at cultural heritage sites 
when ownership rights or the right to control access 
to or present sites are unclear or disputed, generating 
contention among local communities, national 
conservation authorities, international organizations, 
and the tourism industry (Labadi, 2017; Porter & Salazar, 
2005). This is a particular problem where the objectives of 
government authorities at different levels are in conflict 
with one another or where government authorities come 
into conflict with local and extra-local business interests or 
with indigenous or other adjacent local communities that 
have historic connections to cultural heritage sites (Breglia, 
2009; Castañeda, 2009; Meskell, 2012).
Appropriation dilemmas, relating to who may or may 
not use and benefit from the economic and cultural 
values that flow from heritage sites, can lead to overuse 
and rent dissipation (Gardner, Ostrom and Walker 1990). 
Appropriation dilemmas at heritage sites are evident in 
congestion generated by mass tourism (Healy, 1994), 
degeneration in the physical integrity of cultural heritage 
sites (Comer, 2012), decreased quality of heritage 
experiences for tourists (Russo, 2002) and for local residents 
(Aas et al., 2005; Hampton, 2005), commercialization 
that undermines the authenticity of local traditions or 
cultural heritage attractions (Salazar, 2012; Waitt, 2000), 
and often the outright exclusion of local residents from 
sites (Meskell, 2012). Even in the absence of tourism, 
development pressures can cause rent dissipation if 
unregulated behavior by private or public actors leads to 
the destruction of heritage sites or their loss of social value 
(Labadi & Gould, 2015).
Provision issues in heritage concern practices for site 
preservation, conservation, and maintenance. Because 
heritage conservation and commercialization projects 
often generate an unequal distribution of benefits and 
costs, dilemmas over who should bear the cost of such 
interventions routinely arise. Provision dilemmas also 
emerge if public- or private-sector actors with stakes in 
the success of cultural heritage sites hold divergent views 
on the optimal level of conservation or have incompatible 
goals relating to providing for different uses for the site 
itself (Labadi, 2017).
Unsurprisingly given these assignment, appropriation and 
provision dilemmas, monitoring and sanctioning problems 
also arise at heritage sites when various government 
interests with distinct powers to regulate activities reach 
different decisions about site conditions and management 
as a result of incompatible socio-environmental contexts or 
institutional objectives (Labadi & Gould, 2015). A significant 
source of heritage collective action dilemmas is the fact 
that individual actors, for example national ministries, may 
play different and contradictory roles in different contexts.
THE IAD FRAMEWORK AND ACTION 
SITUATION ADJACENCIES AT CULTURAL 
HERITAGE SITES
The IAD framework was developed as a tool to understand 
the conditions under which institutions and actors 
reach collective resolution regarding the governance of 
shared resources or the delivery of shared services. The 
IAD emerged from the study of governance at smaller-
scale natural resource commons, which propelled an 
international research agenda into collective action at the 
community level (E. Ostrom, 1990, 2010). Simultaneously, 
both Elinor and Vincent Ostrom studied the governance 
of multi-scalar and multi-actor collective resources under 
the rubric of polycentric governance or nested institutions 
(E. Ostrom, 1999, 2008, 2010; V. Ostrom, [1972] 1999; 
V. Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren, 1961). In recent years, as 
the concept of a “commons” has been expanded, the 
IAD has been applied to intangible resources, such as 
knowledge and cultural expressions (Frischmann, Madison, 
& Strandburg, 2014, Chapter 1; Hess & Ostrom, 2011).
Among commons scholars, IAD applications to natural 
or intangible resources typically have addressed complexity 
within the frame of one action situation. However, 
polycentricity in practice implies multiple interdependent 
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action situations in both hierarchical and peer-level 
interaction. Recent contributions have extended the IAD 
framework to account for more elaborate models. Studying 
international development aid programs, Gibson et al. 
(2005) identify major actors in the system and propose an 
“octangle” to capture the configuration of linked individual 
actors to explain the complexity of aid delivery and its 
outcomes. McGinnis (2011) introduces the Networks of 
Adjacent Action Situations concept as a means to analyze 
action situations whose outcomes influence the rules 
and other components of interrelated action situations. 
In his framework, action situations involving generic 
governance-related tasks are the fora in which collective 
action dilemmas are addressed. Dennis and Brondizio 
(2020) applied McGinnis’ approach but emphasized 
the importance of problem frames, or decision-maker 
priorities, in the evolution of action situation outcomes in 
regional water management. Lubell (2013), who focused 
on polycentricity rather than the IAD, has addressed 
dynamic public policy processes in environmental contexts 
that feature overlapping and interdependent policy actors, 
institutions and systems. In doing so, he incorporated 
findings from multiple disciplines to present a framework 
for analyzing networks of policy games whose outcomes 
are influenced by payoff or strategy externalities affecting 
other actors and action situations in a manner parallel to 
the NAAS framework.
To date, none of these approaches has been applied in 
the context of cultural heritage sites. Due to the diversity 
of interests and values involved with heritage, collective 
action dilemmas typically arise within and between 
governance task-related action situations where multiple 
actors interact strategically. Because cultural heritage sites, 
especially those listed under the UNESCO World Heritage 
system,1 are implicated in enormously complex polycentric 
governance challenges involving actors at different scales, 
decisions by any subset of actors impinge on the strategic 
options and payoff outcomes available to others. Following 
McGinnis (2011, pp. 55–60), we present in Figure 1 a 
schematic representation of the major categories of actors 
involved in the management of heritage resources, 
their objectives, and the roles that each may assume in 
action situations arising from generic tasks relating to the 
governance of those sites. At a high level of abstraction, we 
identify eight generic actors (many of which are of course 
composed of multiple actors):
1) UNESCO, which represents international interests 
in safeguarding heritage sites through the 
implementation of the World Heritage Convention;
Figure 1 Generic actors and generic action situations in heritage site management (Authors’ analysis, following McGinnis 2011, pp 57–60).
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2) National government agencies (State Party Actors), 
which may have ownership or direct responsibility for 
heritage sites and/or interests in national economic, 
social and political development;
3) Heritage conservation interest groups, including 
international government heritage agencies, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and financing 
sources;
4) Site managing authorities, which frequently are 
government agencies chartered to preserve, conserve, 
and manage visitation at heritage sites but also could 
be NGOs or nonprofit organizations;
5) Local government authorities (LGA) concerned with 
local economies dependent on tourism but who also 
represent other community values attributed to sites, 
especially among indigenous populations;
6) Local community civil society organizations, which may 
represent either sites’ economic or cultural heritage 
values;
7) Tourism sector interests, local businesses, national and 
international travel corporations, tour operators, hotels 
and restaurants, and their supply chains, located within 
and outside of the countries that are home to heritage 
sites; and
8) Visitors themselves, whose patronage generates the 
stream of economic value at each site.
The governance tasks and actors (other than UNESCO) 
presented in Figure 1 are engaged at virtually every cultural 
heritage site. Each generic governance task at a heritage 
site constitutes a distinct action situation that addresses 
one of many aspects of the heritage management process. 
Individual actors may be involved in several action situations 
at the same time, with roles that differ from one action 
situation to the next and the ability to influence the rules of 
linked action situations through their strategic interaction. 
As a result, the ultimate outcome of any governance task-
related action situation at a cultural heritage site depends 
on the outcomes of adjacent governance task-related 
action situations.
APPLYING THE IAD-NAAS FRAMEWORK 
TO CULTURAL HERITAGE SITES
To illustrate the application of the IAD-NAAS framework 
to collective action dilemmas at cultural heritage sites, 
we analyzed selected action situations at two well-known 
UNESCO-listed World Heritage sites, Machu Picchu in 
Peru and Angkor in Cambodia. World Heritage sites were 
selected because each is the subject of an extensive library 
of official documents and other literature upon which to 
draw in developing this analysis. The two subject sites were 
selected because each has prominence at every political 
level from the local to the national to the international; 
each contributes substantially to their national and local 
economies through tourism; and each has been the subject 
of long-running UNESCO scrutiny of the sustainability of the 
site and of community involvement in governance.
Governance scholars recently have addressed 
interactions among constitutional-level actors, including 
UNESCO and national governments, particularly in the 
context of natural heritage sites (Morrison, 2017; Morrison 
et al. 2020). Conversely, in our case studies, we highlight 
the operational level of analysis because constitutional-
level decisions are fragmented among national and 
international entities and collective choice-level 
processes involving multiple stakeholder groups in setting 
constitutional rules and sanctions rarely exist in cultural 
heritage site management. It is at the operational level, in 
day-to-day decisions on site use, tourism loads, financing 
and community development, that governance dilemmas 
are most acute and most politically charged and actors 
from all levels are engaged. Such a focus is consistent 
with the “bottom-up” approach to governance theorizing 
pioneered by Ostrom (1990).
Naturally, in contexts as complex as these, any number 
of interactions among the generic action situations 
identified in Figure 1 could be analyzed. In Figures 2 and 3, 
we selected three focal action situations from each case 
study site, identifying relevant actors, governance tasks, 
and outcomes drawn from official documents and scholarly 
literature. The particular action situations presented were 
selected because they have been core to the history of 
each site yet are sufficiently limited in their scope to enable 
a concise illustration of the applicability of the IAD-NAAS 
framework within the condensed context of a scholarly 
paper. Action situation boundaries were determined by 
identifying the stakeholders involved in each selected 
governance task. Arrows denote how the outcomes of one 
action situation affect any working components of another 
action situation.
Our goal is not to capture every nuance of the action 
situations. Rather it is to present in abstract form the 
essential factors that drove each action situation and the 
interactions among them. We selected two cultural World 
Heritage sites in order to draw upon the rich UNESCO 
documentary record to conduct the desk research that 
illustrates our argument. We intend to demonstrate 
through these cases the feasibility and usefulness of 
the IAD-NAAS framework in analyzing collective action 
problems at all types of heritage sites. Although our 
conclusions regarding the two UNESCO sites we profile 
are consistent with the documentary record, in Ostrom’s 
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Figure 2 Machu Picchu Network of Adjacent Action Situations related to master planning and interactions.
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Figure 3 Angkor Network of Adjacent Action Situations related to resource uses and interactions.
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terms this is a game model representation that does not 
purport to be either a post-hoc review of the actual action 
situations grounded in field research or a predictive model 
of likely behavior. It is intended to demonstrate the utility 
of the IAD-NAAS framework in understanding and resolving 
practical dilemmas at sites.
MACHU PICCHU, PERU
The Historic Sanctuary of Machu Picchu, a cultural and 
environmental reserve of 326 square kilometers, was 
inscribed on UNESCO’s World Heritage List (WHL) in 
1983.2 It contains more than 60 archaeological sites, the 
most important being the Inka citadel of Machu Picchu 
built beginning around 1400, situated in one of the most 
biodiverse areas in Peru. When Peru began aggressive 
tourism development in the 1990’s, Machu Picchu became 
the engine for the heritage-based tourism industry in its 
southern highlands. Visitation to the site has expanded 
from a trickle to over one million visitors in recent years 
despite the logistical challenges involved in bringing people 
to this remote location. The modern town of Machu Picchu 
Pueblo houses families that work in the park and in hotels, 
restaurants, and shops that serve tourists. While a boon to 
Peruvian tourism and its government heritage managers, 
the explosive growth in tourism to Machu Picchu has led 
to contention over preservation and tourist exploitation 
among the stakeholders in the site.
Each national government responsible for a World 
Heritage site is required by UNESCO’s World Heritage 
Committee (WHC) to produce a Master Plan for the site that 
protects the site’s “Outstanding Universal Value” (OUV) 
while enabling tourism and economic development. From 
the early 1990’s, WHC staff reports expressed concern about 
inadequacies in the Machu Picchu master plan and threats 
from tourist development to the OUV of the site. In 1999, 
the WHC staff tabled a proposal to include Machu Picchu on 
the List of World Heritage “In Danger” (UNESCO-WHC, 1999, 
p. 41), a step potentially leading to de-inscription from the 
WHL. Although the economic value of World Heritage listing 
is a matter of debate (Caust & Vecco, 2017), removal from 
the list at best would be an embarrassment and at worst 
could undermine Peru’s national development strategies. 
After 1999, there ensued a multi-year interaction among 
WHC staff, Peruvian government ministries, and local and 
other stakeholders over the future of Machu Picchu. The 
master plan was updated in 2005 and its focus changed 
from a tourism-based strategy towards the conservation 
of the site (INC, 2005). The plan was updated once again in 
2015 (Government of Peru, 2015) but in 2016, the UNESCO 
staff submitted an extensive chronicle of continuing 
problems to the WHC (UNESCO-WHC, 2017, p. 42) and 
again recommended placing Machu Picchu on the “In-
Danger” List. Shortly after, however, the WHC unanimously 
rejected that recommendation (Andina, 2017). A new 
master planning process, still underway in 2020, was 
accompanied in July 2020 by controls on entry to the 
historic site that effectively limit visitation to 2422 visitors 
per day (Government of Peru, 2020), well below peak levels 
in recent years until the Covid 19 pandemic closed the site 
in 2020.
Since 1999, three governance-related action situations 
illustrated in Figure 2 have been at the core of interactions 
among the actors concerned with preservation and 
exploitation of Machu Picchu. Action Situation 1, UNESCO’s 
process for review and approval of the site master plan 
for Machu Picchu (AS1—related to the governance tasks 
of monitoring and sanctioning) triggered Action Situation 
2, negotiations over controls on tourism visitation (AS2—
related to assignment and appropriation). Action Situation 
3, achieving local community collaboration and support 
(AS3—related to provision and production of the site 
and the tourist experience) affects and is affected by 
both associated action situations. Organized community 
involvement in site management has been mandated 
by UNESCO and community investments and attitudes 
are essential elements of the tourist experience at 
Machu Picchu.
The two actors in AS1 share the objective to conserve 
the OUV of Machu Picchu and its World Heritage branding. 
However, UNESCO has internal incentives to demonstrate its 
regulatory effectiveness and maintain internal consensus 
with the WHC, while the State Party Actors also are focused 
on sustaining the economic benefits of tourism in AS2 
and managing political relations with local actors in AS2 
and AS3. UNESCO’s internal dynamics incline WHC staff to 
critique inadequate plans but historically have made the 
WHC itself wary of sanctions. The State Party Actors face a 
choice between agreeing to visitation constraints called for 
by UNESCO and facing domestic criticism or risking UNESCO 
sanctions by aligning with LGA and the tourism sector 
actors to maximize tourism opportunities. The network of 
interactions among these adjacent action situations is the 
focus of this case analysis.
UNESCO triggers AS1 through annual or biennial 
Master Plan reviews, levying demands on State Parties 
for, among other matters, controls on tourist impact that 
affect the payoffs for domestic actors. UNESCO for many 
years urged execution of a “carrying capacity” study and 
implementation of controls over daily visitation to the Inka 
citadel via timed-ticketing or otherwise, which ultimately 
occurred only in 2020. The response to this new policy 
has been public criticism of the national government for 
acquiescing to UNESCO. State Parties need to accommodate 
local and national tourism interests that are the subject 
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of AS2, which constrains the choice of strategic options 
available to UNESCO (as, do the politics within the WHC 
that we acknowledge but do not analyze here).
Under pressure from UNESCO, the Peruvian government 
in 1999 (UNESCO, 1999) created a formal local governing 
entity, the UGM, including local organizations, the local 
Ministry of Culture and eventually a new “Amazon 
entrance” at Santa Teresa. That directive redefined the 
boundaries of AS2 and AS3 by empowering new actors. 
The process for securing local government consent and 
community support in AS3 further constrained UNESCO’s 
available strategic actions in AS1 because UNESCO 
mandated LGA involvement, and the outcomes of AS3 limit 
the choices available to the stakeholders in AS2 who need 
local collaboration and support and so must ensure that 
local actors enjoy adequate payoffs from the site. Finally, 
a portion of entrance fees to Machu Picchu are used to 
conserve the site and to finance local government activities 
within the LGA. Therefore, outcomes in AS2 directly affect 
the resources available to the local authorities, and hence 
the potential payoffs in AS3 from collaboration or defection 
by local communities. Although the LGA is not monolithic, 
as depicted in this paper, and consists of communities 
that themselves are in contention over resources, all 
components of the LGA do share the basic interests 
identified in Figures 1 and 2.
The objectives of the actors in each action situation are 
critical to the outcomes. The Peruvian parties are unified 
by their objective to preserve the economic benefits of 
tourism, but separated by the State Party Actors’ desire to 
reach agreement with UNESCO in order both to preserve 
the site’s OUV and to avoid sanctions from UNESCO. The 
LGA actors in AS3 are empowered by UNESCO and able 
to use the leverage of withholding local support both to 
constrain UNESCO’s choice options and those facing actors 
in AS2. However, without a vibrant tourist traffic to Machu 
Picchu, the LGA would be economically bereft and so is 
highly incentivized to compromise with other Peruvian 
political forces.
Thus, the ultimate outcome of these action situations 
depends on the degree to which UNESCO’s threats of 
sanctions are perceived to be credible and damaging, and 
the internal political dynamics among State Party Actors, 
the LGA, and the tourism sector. For almost two decades, 
the WHC has acquiesced to management plans for Machu 
Picchu that its staff deemed unsatisfactory and has balked 
at imposing sanctions. In that time, tourist traffic grew 
rapidly, as has alarm over potential damage to the site’s 
OUV. Although in 2020 the Peruvian government adopted 
visitor capacity limitations long sought by UNESCO, UNESCO 
also concurred in plans for a new entrance and visitor 
center that, when constructed, may support even greater 
admissions to Machu Picchu. Peru also continues with 
plans for a new international airport at nearby Chinchero, 
which may further exacerbate visitor pressure and conflict 
among local communities. The consequences of these 
latest developments for Machu Picchu will not be known 
for years.
ANGKOR, CAMBODIA
Stretching over 400 square kilometers in Cambodia’s 
northern province of Siem Reap, Angkor Archaeological 
Park is one of the largest archaeological sites in the world, 
containing remains of the different capitals of the Khmer 
Empire from the 9th to the 15th centuries. Along with its 
architectural, archaeological, and artistic significance, 
Angkor is a cultural landscape with cultural, religious and 
symbolic value still vibrant among the local population. 
A central characteristic of the Angkor World Heritage 
site is that the property remains inhabited, with more 
than 139,000 people distributed among 112 villages 
scattered over the site. Since its inclusion in the UNESCO 
World Heritage List in 1992, the site has been under the 
supervision of an international coordinating committee 
(ICC-Angkor) led by France, Japan and UNESCO whose 
primary purpose has been to coordinate the international 
cooperative effort to safeguard the monuments from 
decay and destruction and to support establishment of an 
institutional and legal framework for the protection of the 
site (ICC-Angkor & UNESCO, 2014; Miura, 2011b). Given the 
complexity and prominence of the Angkor site, a national 
Authority for the Protection of the Site and Management 
of the Region of Angkor (APSARA) was created in 1995. 
APSARA is responsible for the protection of the monuments 
and archeological areas and enforcement of the zoning 
law that regulates land access and use of the site, including 
visitor flows, on-site tourism services, and local population 
activities.
After a post-inscription period mainly characterized by 
conservation efforts, since 2000 Angkor has become a major 
destination for heritage tourism, today hosting over three 
million international and domestic tourists per year. In this 
second phase, UNESCO State of Conservation reports3 and 
other literature suggest that dilemmas in the management 
of the site have arisen among conservation requirements, 
the desire for tourism development, and concern for the 
livelihoods and traditional values of the local population. 
Local communities have been allowed to continue living 
within the landscape subject to restrictions imposed 
by the legal framework established to protect Angkor 
Archeological Park.4 These laws authorized expropriation in 
the public interest and prohibited alteration or modification 
to structures without approval from local authorities in the 
core and buffer zones of the World Heritage site (Miura, 
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2011a; Winter, 2007). Despite their traditional presence 
in the area and being stewards of traditional agricultural 
and intangible heritage practices connected to Angkor 
temples, local residents persist as mere “authorized 
users” (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992) of Angkor resources. At 
the same time, while tourism is the main driver of social 
and economic change in the Angkor area, the benefits 
from tourism development have not broadly benefitted 
local communities or been widely linked to community 
development (Hauser-Schäublin, 2011; Thyl De Lopez, 
Ponlok, Proeung, Sinoeun, & Thea, 2006). The Angkor 
Heritage Management Framework (Apsara et al., 2013) and 
Tourism Management Plan (Godden Mackay Logan, 2012) 
clearly address these issues. However, given the complexity 
and scale of the site, the effective implementation of 
the plans depends crucially on solving collective action 
situations whose outcomes are strongly connected. The 
policy setting characterizing the implementation of the 
management plan of Angkor is illustrated in Figure 3 as a set 
of adjacent action situations involving the preservation of 
monuments and landscape, the regulation of community 
practices, and the management of tourism development.
Action Situation 1, preservation of monuments and 
landscape (AS1—related to provision and production, e.g. 
conservation, of the site itself) refers to the interaction 
among the main authorities of the site (ICC-Angkor and 
APSARA), donors and NGOs around the protection of 
monuments and landscape. The main resource produced 
and provided in AS1 is the preservation of Angkor as a 
public good. While the level of preservation depends 
on the level of funding and coordination of strategies 
among several actors, the outcome of AS1 is influenced 
by the outcomes of the two adjacent action situations 
relating to the management of local community 
practices and land use and the tourism trade, which 
together ultimately determine the pressure on the site, 
the economic contribution from tourism revenues, and 
the local population’s contribution to the archaeological 
heritage by sustaining intangible heritage values such as 
community practices and traditions. Depending on how 
APSARA implements, enforces or negotiates access and 
use policies, the other two action situations determine 
how Angkor’s tangible resources and heritage values are 
assigned and appropriated by the tourism industry and the 
local population.
Action Situation 2, community practices and land use 
management (AS2—relating to the assignment and 
appropriation of Angkor for community economic and 
traditional uses) is a separate forum, involving strategic 
interaction among the local community, APSARA, NGOs 
and the Heritage Police to shape the local population’s 
capacity to earn a livelihood and sustain heritage values 
at Angkor. Residents within the Angkor site have a clear 
interest in upholding traditional socio-economic practices 
and access to land resources or, alternatively, securing 
social and economic benefits from the conservation of 
the site and tourism development. Although pro-poor and 
community development projects have been implemented 
by local authorities and some local community members 
do derive economic benefit from employment by APSARA, 
AS2 is the action situation potentially most influenced by 
the outcomes arising in the two adjacent action situations. 
Regulations imposing restrictions over traditional economic 
practices, construction projects and land tenure are in 
line with the objective of protecting the integrity and the 
heritage values of the monuments and the archeological 
park (AS1). However, they negatively affect choice and 
position rules that determine the economic opportunities 
and heritage values of the local inhabitants. Similarly, 
outcomes in the tourism trade action situation influence 
payoff and scope rules affecting community practices and 
the degree to which local inhabitants can derive direct 
benefits or are adversely affected by externalities arising 
from tourism development.
Action Situation 3, the tourism trade (AS3—related to the 
assignment and appropriation of site resources for tourism 
purposes) governs the trajectory of tourism development 
and its implications for tourism infrastructure outside of 
the heritage site. The private firms, national Ministry of 
Tourism, and local government actors(Siem Reap LGA) 
involved share clear incentives to develop Angkor as a visitor 
attraction, with outcomes such as the number of permits 
to develop tourism infrastructure, the level of investment, 
and the revenues and profits generated by the tourism 
sector. APSARA is not directly involved in AS3, but to protect 
the integrity and authenticity of the site it could influence 
the outcome of AS3 through AS1 by regulating the level of 
visitor flows to the site. This in turn affects the available 
choices and payoffs of players in the tourism trade that 
rely on maximizing Angkor as a visitor attraction in order 
to appropriate economic value from tourism development.
The network of adjacent action situations depicted in 
Figure 3 can be used to analyze alternative outcomes in 
the management and conservation of Angkor over time, 
corresponding in part to different phases in the evolution 
of tourism planning and management at Angkor. During 
the immediate post-inscription period, conservation of 
the site was paramount to official stakeholders. With 
rapidly growing numbers of visitors and often unregulated 
development of the tourism sector, APSARA and other 
government authorities accommodated the tourism 
sector’s objective to extract value from exploitation of the 
site. The integrity and heritage values of the archeological 
park were protected mainly through restrictions over local 
285Bertacchini and Gould International Journal of the Commons DOI: 10.5334/ijc.1089
villagers’ traditional economic practices, construction rights, 
and land tenure. While leveraging growing mass tourism 
demand, actors in the tourism trade action situation (AS3) 
did not internalize the negative externalities that tourist 
pressure generated on the integrity of the monuments 
(AS1) or on the local community (AS2). Furthermore, 
compliance with regulations that were in conflict with local 
population priorities proved to be problematic, increasing 
policing and enforcement costs for APSARA.
In a subsequent phase, APSARA, backed by the national 
government and the international community, took steps 
to overcome the negative externalities arising from mass 
tourism and the fast-growing tourism infrastructure. Winter 
(2007) suggests that attempts to give APSARA greater 
control of visitor management and transport facilities 
were intended to promote the site as a quality destination, 
enhancing tourist and visitor experience. However, the 
local tourism sector in AS3 opposed this policy proposal 
because it entailed more costs to adapt to the new tourism 
and visitor management system. At the same time, under 
this new policy, the local population in AS2, while obtaining 
some benefit from less tourist interference with religious 
and cultural practices, remained constrained by site 
conservation efforts aimed at preserving the “authenticity” 
of the cultural landscape and of old villages within the 
protected area (Miura, 2011a).
Finally, recent years have seen a further shift in 
management priorities toward a greater recognition of 
“living heritage” conditions within the Angkor site and 
attempts to find strategies to channel the benefits of 
tourism development to the local community. Under 
Angkor’s Heritage Management Framework and the 
Tourism Management Plan, APSARA is obliged to implement 
a management strategy directed toward a greater 
recognition of local population practices and community 
values and simultaneously to promote tourism projects 
that foster greater participation by local communities. 
While this outcome may be equally desirable for APSARA 
and the local community, it remains difficult to achieve 
due to actors’ conflicting incentives across adjacent action 
situations. Local governing authorities and the tourism 
sector will need to adapt to a profoundly different tourism 
model, generating losses on sunk costs and obstacles to 
channel positive economic benefits from tourism activities 
to the local population while preserving heritage values. 
For example, shifting to sustainable tourism implies a 
reduction of visitor flows, at least in peak periods, reducing 
the return on the investment made by public and private 
actors in the tourism infrastructure and accommodation 
facilities. Similarly, the acknowledged inability by the 
local population to supply the tourism market with 
products and services (Mao et al., 2014) entails significant 
coordination costs among APSARA, the tourism sector, and 
local communities to develop community-based tourism 
programs. Finally, while existing restrictions on community 
practices and land use align with protecting the integrity 
and heritage values of the monuments and archeological 
park, they do not perfectly suit current “living heritage” 
conditions within the Angkor site.
DISCUSSION
The case studies presented here demonstrate the utility 
of the IAD-NAAS framework by exploring collective action 
dilemmas at complex cultural heritage sites from two 
complementary perspectives. The Machu Picchu study 
applies the IAD-NAAS framework to repeated interactions 
that stretched over a period of 20 years in a network of 
action situations concerning one discrete issue—the 
approval of the site masterplan and UNESCO’s desire 
to preserve the site’s OUV in the context of a relatively 
static competition pitting tourist visitation levels against 
preservation of the site. The Angkor study applies the IAD-
NAAS framework to a sequence of management decisions 
taken over a similar period of time but reflecting changing 
outcomes in adjacent action situations that result from 
changes in governance priorities that affected the actions 
and objectives of the actors involved.
The IAD was developed initially to probe the governance 
dynamics of natural resource commons (E. Ostrom, 1990, 
2005). It has evolved over time to address more intangible 
commons resource systems such as scientific data and 
information, economic development aid, software, and 
scholarly output (Frischmann et al., 2014; Hess & Ostrom, 
2011). As such, the boundaries of resource types to which 
the IAD has been applied have proven to be highly elastic. 
In most such studies, however, the focus generally has 
been on individual action situations. We argue that the 
IAD framework applied to a single focal action situation, 
however complexly elaborated, is inadequate to capture the 
multi-scalar, polycentric, and highly interactive dynamics 
of cultural heritage sites when viewed as resource systems 
subject to commons dilemmas.
Thus, our approach expands on the implementation of 
the IAD by Gibson et al. in The Samaritan’s Dilemma (2005) 
and tackles the same class of problems considered by Lubell 
(2013) and McGinnis (2011). Gibson et al. focused on the 
behavioral incentives and interactions of the actors involved 
in a complex institutional context such as international 
development assistance, and highlighted actor interactions 
and the consequences of excluding particular actors from 
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decision making and implementation. We also emphasize 
the importance of actor interaction but position those 
interactions within governance-related action situations 
that highlight the conflicting roles individual actors may 
play while performing in differing governance tasks. 
Furthermore, while Lubell’s Ecology of Games offers an 
abstract and eclectic approach that captures polycentric 
complexity, it is difficult to envision applying that framework 
in concrete heritage situations.
Instead, our analysis follows McGinnis (2011) to identify 
each action situation with a generic governance task in 
a manner that demonstrates how governance-related 
action situations impact upon one another and on the 
sites themselves. By focusing on action situations related 
to interlaced governance tasks, the case studies illuminate 
the tensions arising when state parties, local community 
groups, tourism industry actors and others play roles in 
multiple action situations that impact one another in the 
governance process. The more discrete assessment of 
actors enabled by the IAD-NAAS framework yields more 
productive and actionable insights into the dynamics of 
complex institutional settings.
In the case of Machu Picchu, for example, for two 
decades the stakeholder actors in adjacent action 
situations have faced largely invariant payoffs, the strategic 
constraints each set of actors imposes on the options of 
others have become more complex, and the distribution 
of power among the actors has led to continuing UNESCO 
dissatisfaction with management plans, potentially 
excessive but lucrative tourism, and consequent threats 
to Machu Picchu’s OUV. The countervailing pressures 
across the adjacent action situations—tensions between 
development and tourism objectives, intra-governmental 
rivalries at UNESCO and within Peru, and pressures to 
conserve and protect Machu Picchu itself—have led the 
actors at Machu Picchu to settle for many years into a 
suboptimal Nash equilibrium in which no actor is fully 
content with the outcome.
At Angkor, by contrast, the roles and behaviors of 
various actors in governance-related action situations 
have changed over time as the over-riding objectives 
of the parties shifted from preservation to tourist 
exploitation and then to community empowerment. Those 
changing objectives strongly resemble the “frames” for 
governance decision-making emphasized by Dennis and 
Brondizio (2020) in their application of the NAAS to water 
management institutions. The Angkor example illustrates 
how an analysis based on the IAD-NAAS framework 
illuminates how and why networks of action situations 
adapt to changing circumstances when actors’ frames for 
decision-making change.
CONCLUSION
Although the dilemmas arising in conservation and 
management of cultural heritage are well understood by 
heritage professionals, methodologies for disentangling 
competing actors’ objectives and interactions, and 
advancing collective interest in the heritage resource 
system, are in fact limited. This is the root of much criticism 
of heritage management in practice, and disputes among 
stakeholders and consequent management failures at 
cultural heritage sites have become a focus for scholarly 
attention. In this paper, we argue that the conservation and 
management of cultural heritage sites can be conceived as 
a set of interdependent collective action problems and the 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, 
in conjunction with McGinnis’ Network of Adjacent Action 
Situations (NAAS), can be applied to diagnose the drivers of 
conflict and management failures at those sites.
The primary contribution of this article has been to 
demonstrate how through the application of the IAD-
NAAS framework to the governance of heritage sites, 
heritage scholars and practitioners may better understand 
interactions among actors, objectives, rules in use, and the 
socio-environmental context of the communities involved. 
By analyzing the linkages among governance-related action 
situations, scholars and practitioners may be better able to 
identify and rectify the factors leading to dysfunction in 
site governance. With such knowledge, practitioners could 
investigate and experiment with changes to institutional 
rules, rewards, and sanctions in order to achieve more 
consistently desirable outcomes in cultural heritage 
management. Research into the potential for such a policy-
related application for the IAD-NAAS constitutes an urgent 
next phase in the introduction of commons scholarship to 
the heritage field.
The second contribution of this article resides in extending 
the commons scholarship to cultural heritage sites. So far, 
only few works have addressed cultural resources under 
a commons perspective (Bertacchini, Bravo, Marrelli, & 
Santagata, 2012; Gerber & Hess, 2017) or have used the 
Ostrom’s Workshop analytical tools to study community-
based governance models of heritage conservation (Gould, 
2018a, In press). By untangling the multiple collective 
action dilemmas arising at cultural heritage sites, our 
analysis helps to conceptualize cultural heritage sites in 
a more comprehensive way as multi-attribute, multi-use 
resources that are enjoyed and managed by a community 
of diverse stakeholders who operate at different scales 
and may express divergent interests in the uses of the 
resource. At the same time, the polycentric governance 
challenges posed by the conservation and management of 
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cultural heritage sites represent a novel field of empirical 
application useful to test the theoretical underpinnings 
of the recent literature extending the IAD framework to 
account for networks of interrelated action situations.
NOTES
1 A World Heritage site is a landmark or area with legal protection 
under the 1972 international Convention Concerning the Protection 
of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, administered by 
UNESCO. World Heritage Sites, which may be either of cultural or 
environmental/landscape importance, are designated by UNESCO 
through a selection process emphasizing sites’ outstanding cultural 
and natural significance for humanity.
2 For UNESCO State of Conservation Reports and other documents 
relating to Machu Picchu, see https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/274/
documents/.
3 For UNESCO State of Conservation Reports and other documents 
relating to Angkor, see https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/668/
documents/.
4 1996 Law on the Protection of Cultural Heritage, 1994 Royal Decree 
establishing Protected Cultural Zones in the Siem Reap/Angkor 
Region and Guidelines for their Management; and 2004 Royal 
Decree on the Zoning and Management of the Siem Reap/Angkor 
region.
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